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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Today we decide whether the phrase “particularly 
serious crime” as used in both the asylum and withholding of 
removal statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2), 1231(b)(3), includes, 
but is not limited to, aggravated felonies.  We hold that it does.  
The phrase “particularly serious crime” means the same thing 
in both statutes, and the language of those statutes shows that 
aggravated felonies are a subset of particularly serious crimes.   
 
In reaching this conclusion, we overrule Alaka v. 
Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), where we 
defined the phrase “particularly serious crime” in the context 
of withholding of removal to include only aggravated felonies.   
Because we revisit this precedent and agree with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision that Petitioner Carlos 
Eduardo Bastardo-Vale committed a particularly serious crime 
that barred him from obtaining asylum and withholding of 
removal relief, we will deny the petition for review.   
 
I 
 
Bastardo-Vale petitions for review of the BIA decision 
that his conviction for second-degree unlawful imprisonment 
under Delaware law constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” 
rendering him ineligible for both asylum and withholding of 
removal relief.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2), 1231(b)(3).  His state 
conviction arose from a forcible sexual encounter with a 
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college freshman (“victim”).  At the time of the incident, 
Bastardo-Vale, a native and citizen of Venezuela who entered 
the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa, was a 
graduate resident assistant at Goldey-Beacom College.   
 
In the early morning of November 10, 2013, Bastardo-
Vale returned to his apartment.  There, by the victim’s account, 
Bastardo-Vale invited her to his apartment where he forcibly 
pulled her into his room and began raping her, or by Bastardo-
Vale’s account, they began to have consensual sex.  According 
to the police report, the victim told Bastardo-Vale to “‘stop’ 
numerous times but he refused.”  A.R. 2187.  She “freed herself 
by using her knee to strike [Bastardo-Vale] in the rib cage and 
push him off of her body.”  Id.  The victim and Bastardo-Vale 
both left the apartment.  About forty-five minutes later, 
Bastardo-Vale encountered security guards elsewhere on 
campus, who told him that they were looking for him because 
he had been accused of rape and instructed him to “stay.”  A.R. 
260.  Bastardo-Vale ignored their direction, returned to his 
apartment to retrieve a used condom, and tossed it into a 
dumpster.  He claimed that he discarded the evidence because, 
as a graduate resident assistant, he risked losing his scholarship 
by having sexual relations with a freshman.   
 
Bastardo-Vale pleaded no contest to second-degree 
unlawful imprisonment in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 781 and was sentenced to the maximum term of one year’s 
imprisonment, which was suspended for eleven months of time 
served.   
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then 
charged Bastardo-Vale with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for being convicted of a crime involving 
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moral turpitude, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), for 
failing to comply with the conditions of his nonimmigrant 
status.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Bastardo-Vale was 
removable because he had stopped attending college and thus 
failed to comply with the “conditions of his admission to non-
immigrant student status.”  A.R. 197.  Bastardo-Vale applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”) relief based primarily on his claim that he was 
harmed in his country of origin on account of an imputed 
political opinion stemming from his mother’s political 
activities.  DHS argued that Bastardo-Vale was not entitled to 
asylum and withholding of removal because he had been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime and was a “danger to 
the community of the United States.”  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(3)(B)(ii).  The IJ rejected that 
argument and instead of applying Alaka, which limited the 
phrase “particularly serious crime” to aggravated felonies, it 
relied on In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), aff’d 
per curiam, 587 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).  Applying N-A-
M-, the IJ determined that Bastardo-Vale’s conviction was not 
for a particularly serious crime because (1) it “was based on a 
plea agreement pursuant to which [he] pled no contest,” A.R. 
203; (2) there was no evidence suggesting he used “physical 
force to confine the victim in his apartment,” A.R. 204, and (3) 
he “received a sentence of one year, all of which was 
suspended for time served . . . [which] suggest[s] that the 
criminal court did not consider him a danger to the 
community,” A.R. 204.  The IJ noted that Bastardo-Vale’s 
attempt to dispose of evidence was “very troubling” but 
insufficient to make his crime a particularly serious offense.  
A.R. 204.  The IJ therefore found that he was eligible for 
asylum and had no need to consider his request for withholding 
of removal or CAT relief.  DHS appealed the IJ’s finding that 
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Bastardo-Vale’s conviction was not for a particularly serious 
crime.   
 
 The BIA agreed with DHS, disregarded our precedent 
in Alaka, and held that Bastardo-Vale had “been convicted of 
a particularly serious crime under [the BIA’s] case-by-case 
approach set forth in,” among other cases, N-A-M-.  A.R. 6.  
The BIA concluded that the Delaware unlawful imprisonment 
statute encompasses conduct involving physical force and 
intimidation, as well as that which “places at risk a particularly 
vulnerable segment of society . . . [so the] conviction falls 
within the potential ambit of a particularly serious crime.”  
A.R. 6.  The BIA concluded the circumstances of Bastardo-
Vale’s offense demonstrated its seriousness because “[t]he use 
of physical force to overcome another’s desire to terminate a 
sexual encounter, whether originally consented to or not, is an 
inherently violent act that places a victim in fear for their 
safety.”  A.R. 6-7.  The BIA held that Bastardo-Vale’s 
conviction for a particularly serious crime barred him from 
receiving asylum and withholding of removal but remanded 
the matter to the IJ to address whether he was entitled to CAT 
relief.1   
                                                                
1 In reaching this conclusion, the BIA did not cite and 
in fact did not follow Alaka.  Rather, it relied upon its own 
decision in In re M-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 46 (BIA 2012), where 
it held that, under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), it had the authority to apply its 
own interpretation.  The BIA in M-H-, in turn, reasoned that 
(1) Alaka did not hold that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) was 
unambiguous, M-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 49, (2) applying its 
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own precedent to matters arising in the Third Circuit would 
“promote national uniformity in the application of the 
particularly serious crime bar for withholding of removal,” id., 
and (3) using its own precedent would “provide consistency in 
the treatment of the particularly serious crime bars for [both] 
asylum and withholding of removal” cases, id. at 49-50.   
 
The IJ and BIA’s blatant disregard of the binding 
regional precedent is ultra vires.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 
F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The BIA is required to follow 
court of appeals precedent within the geographical confines of 
the relevant circuit.” (citation omitted)).  While we understand 
the value of uniform treatment of similarly situated aliens and 
acknowledge that, until now, our circuit precedent differed 
from that of other circuits, Brand X did not provide the IJ or 
BIA the authority to ignore the applicable regional circuit’s 
precedent.  See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 553; Saravia v. Att’y 
Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 731 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that an IJ must 
follow circuit precedent despite the BIA’s “subsequent 
contrary decision” (citation omitted)).  To the contrary, Brand 
X provides that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a 
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to 
Chevron deference . . . if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”  545 U.S. at 
982.      
 
In Alaka, we did not hold that the phrase “particularly 
serious crime” in the withholding of removal statute was 
ambiguous.  Thus, the case on which the BIA and IJ relied, M-
H-, misunderstood Alaka’s view of the statutory phrase.  M-H- 
reasoned that since Alaka did not expressly state that the 
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withholding statute was “unambiguous,” the agency was free 
to disregard our interpretation of the statute and impose its 
own.  26 I. & N. Dec. at 49.  There are two related problems 
with this view.  First, Alaka stated that the “plain language and 
structure” of the withholding statute “indicate[d] that an 
offense must be an aggravated felony” to be particularly 
serious.  456 F.3d at 104.  This demonstrated that the Alaka 
court did not view the withholding statute as ambiguous. 
Second, the absence of Chevron-type language from Alaka, 
such as an explicit statement that the statute was unambiguous, 
is understandable because the BIA had not interpreted the 
clause at issue when the Alaka court ruled.  Thus, the Alaka 
court had no reason to use language relevant to deciding 
whether we are obligated to defer to an agency’s interpretation.  
The lack of magic words like “unambiguous” and use of words 
like “suggest” or “implies,” when viewed in context of Alaka’s 
focus on the statute’s language and structure, conveys that it 
viewed the statute as clear.  See Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta 
Tribe of Texas, 918 F.3d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
a “prior judicial decision need not say in so many magic words 
that its holding is the only permissible interpretation of the 
statute in order for that holding to be binding on an agency” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Because the 
BIA’s interpretation of Alaka is predicated on an erroneous 
view that Alaka did not hold that the statute was unambiguous, 
we need not defer to its interpretation.  Compare M-H-, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. at 49, with Alabama-Coushatta Tribe, 918 F.3d at 
449 (holding that “a court should not defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute if a ‘judicial precedent hold[s] that 
the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
interpretation’” (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83)).  
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On remand, Bastardo-Vale withdrew his CAT claim, 
and the IJ ordered Bastardo-Vale removed.  Bastardo-Vale 
appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA for it to certify the ruling 
as final and petitioned our Court for review.2  The BIA 
determined that “there [was] nothing left for [it] to decide 
regarding” Bastardo-Vale’s asylum or withholding of removal 
applications, Supp. App. 10, but again remanded the matter for 
the IJ to determine his country of removal.  The IJ subsequently 
ordered Bastardo-Vale removed to Venezuela.   
 
Bastardo-Vale seeks review of the BIA’s determination 
that his conviction for second-degree unlawful imprisonment 
qualifies as a particularly serious crime and asserts that he is 
entitled to asylum and withholding of removal.  He claims that 
the BIA erred in disregarding Alaka and holding that his non-
aggravated offense was a “particularly serious crime” that bars 
him from relief.   
 
After oral argument before a panel of our Court, we 
elected sua sponte to hear the case en banc to determine 
whether Alaka remains good law.  We now examine the phrase 
“particularly serious crime” under both the asylum and 
withholding of removal statutes as well as the rulings of our 
sister circuits who have concluded that the phrase “particularly 
                                                                
2 Although Bastardo-Vale prematurely filed his petition 
for review before a final order of removal was entered, such an 
order has since been entered, and thus we now have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 
488, 494 (3d Cir. 2012).  The Government recognizes that we 
have jurisdiction and has moved to withdraw its motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which we will grant.     
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serious crime” is not limited to aggravated felonies in either the 
asylum or withholding of removal context.  
 
II3 
 
A 
 
The IJ granted Bastardo-Vale asylum but the BIA 
overturned that ruling because it found that Bastardo-Vale was 
convicted of an offense it deemed to be a particularly serious 
crime, even though it was not an aggravated felony.  To 
determine whether this is correct, we will first review the 
statutory framework for asylum. 
 
The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General may grant an asylum application if the alien shows that 
he is a “refugee” who is persecuted due to his race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  Asylum, 
however, is unavailable to an alien, “convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime,” whom the Attorney 
General determines “constitutes a danger to the community of 
the United States.”  Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).   
 
The phrase “particularly serious crime” is not defined in 
§ 1158, but Congress included two “Special Rules” within the 
asylum statute addressing the subject.  Id.             
                                                                
 3 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2 and 
the BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  When, as 
here, the BIA issues its own opinion on the merits, we review 
the BIA’s decision, not that of the IJ.  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 
F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).   
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§ 1158(b)(2)(B).  The Special Rules provide:   
 
(i) Conviction of aggravated felony  
 
For purposes of clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) 
[which bars an alien convicted of a particularly 
serious crime from asylum relief], an alien who 
has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall 
be considered to have been convicted of a 
particularly serious crime. 
 
(ii) Offenses 
 
The Attorney General may designate by 
regulation offenses that will be considered to be 
a crime described in clause (ii) . . . of 
subparagraph (A). 
 
Id.  While the language in subsection (i) automatically 
designates aggravated felonies as particularly serious crimes, 
subsection (ii) shows that Congress did not limit the definition 
of particularly serious crimes to aggravated felonies.  Indeed, 
the asylum statute authorizes the Attorney General to designate 
by regulation other offenses as particularly serious crimes.  Id. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii).  To say that the statute limits the types of 
offenses that could be considered particularly serious to 
aggravated felonies would render superfluous the Attorney 
General’s power to designate offenses as particularly serious 
crimes by regulation.  Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 556 (4th 
Cir. 2010).  Our reading ensures that we “give effect to every 
word” of the statute.  Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) 
(citation omitted).  
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Moreover, reading “particularly serious crime” to 
include only aggravated felonies would improperly render the 
phrase meaningless as it would just be an alternate phrase for 
“aggravated felony.”  See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 
31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if 
it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)).  Reading the plain language of the 
asylum statute to provide that aggravated felonies are just one 
category of crimes that are deemed particularly serious would 
give the phrases “particularly serious crime” and “aggravated 
felony” independent meaning.   
 
Such a reading would also render meaningless the 
Attorney General’s power to designate other crimes as serious.  
See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (“There is little question that this latter provision 
permits the Attorney General, by regulation, to make particular 
crimes categorically particularly serious even though they are 
not aggravated felonies.” (emphasis omitted)); Gao, 595 F.3d 
at 556 (“Given that the statute makes all aggravated felonies 
per se particularly serious, the Attorney General’s power to 
designate offenses as such by regulation would be ‘wholly 
redundant’ if it were limited to aggravated felonies.” (citation 
omitted)); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“The Attorney General (or his agents) may determine 
that a crime is particularly serious for purposes of the asylum 
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), even though it is not an 
aggravated felony.”); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 
2006) (“Nowhere does § 1158 purport to prohibit the Attorney 
General from determining in a given case that an alien’s 
nonaggravated felony is ‘particularly serious’ unless he had the 
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foresight to explicitly itemize that particular crime by 
regulation.”).   
 
Congress’s grant of authority to the Attorney General to 
promulgate regulations to identify other offenses as 
particularly serious crimes further demonstrates that offenses 
other than aggravated felonies could be designated as per se 
particularly serious crimes.  Through rulemaking, the Attorney 
General gives notice to the public of offenses, in addition to 
aggravated felonies, that may be designated as per se 
“particularly serious crimes” and receives comments.  This 
authorization, however, is permissive and does not preclude 
the Attorney General from evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the facts and circumstances of a conviction also 
support concluding that an individual alien committed a 
particularly serious crime.  Immigration officials have 
proceeded via case-by-case adjudication since the early 1980s.  
See Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1106 (citing In re Frentescu, 18 I. & 
N. Dec. 244, 247 (1982)).  We presume that Congress was 
aware of this procedure in 1996 when it granted the Attorney 
General the authority to identify by regulation categories of 
crimes that may be deemed per se particularly serious crimes.  
See id. (“Although Congress has amended the asylum statute’s 
particularly serious crime bar over time, none of its actions 
have called into question the BIA’s authority to designate 
offenses as particularly serious crimes through case-by-case 
adjudication.”); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 
(1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to 
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change.”).  Thus, the grant of regulatory authority to designate 
classes of offenses as particularly serious crimes did not 
displace the Attorney General’s authority to also make case-
14 
specific determinations concerning whether an alien’s offense 
should be deemed “particularly serious.”4  See Delgado, 648 
                                                                
4 In his dissent, Judge McKee contends that the phrase 
“by regulation” in the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(B)(ii), operates as a limitation that precludes the 
use of case-by-case adjudication to determine whether certain 
crimes are particularly serious.  There are several problems 
with this interpretation.   
First, this reading overlooks the word “may” that 
precedes the phrase “by regulation.”  Id.  The word “may” 
conveys permission for the agency to act in a particular way 
but does not mandate that the agency act only in that one 
fashion.  May, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/may (last visited July 26, 2019) 
(defining “may” as “have permission to” or “be free to”); May, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “may” as 
“[t]o be permitted to”); see Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l 
Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 393 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting the 
“permissive sense” of the word “may”).   
Second, Congress knows how to limit an agency to 
rulemaking or to adjudication.  For example, the Attorney 
General can parole aliens “for urgent humanitarian reasons or 
significant public benefit,” but can do so “only on a case-by-
case basis,” not by using prospective rulemaking.  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(d)(5)(A).  Moreover, Congress has at times distinguished 
between mandatory and permissive uses of rulemaking.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(1)(G) (“The Secretary [of 
Health and Human Services] shall specify by regulation the 
methodology to be used” for rendering certain kinds of 
payments) with id. § 1395m(a)(12) (“The Secretary may 
designate, by regulation . . . one carrier for one or more entire 
regions to process all claims within the region for covered 
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items under this section.”).  Similarly, Congress has at times 
required agencies to use rulemaking to achieve a certain result.  
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (providing that if some 
conditions are met, “the Administrator [of the Environmental 
Protection Agency] shall promulgate regulations establishing . 
. . performance standards”); id. § 7409(a)(1)(A) (providing that 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
“shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a national 
primary ambient air quality standard”).  In short, Congress 
could have written the asylum statute so that the agency could 
proceed only by rulemaking or only by adjudication.  
Congress, however, has not done so here.  The absence of such 
language makes clear that Congress did not displace the 
Attorney General’s longstanding discretion to choose between 
rulemaking and adjudication.  See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. 
SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that “[t]he 
courts have consistently held that where an agency, as in this 
case, is given an option to proceed by rulemaking or by 
individual adjudication the choice is one that lies in the 
informed discretion of the administrative agency”).      
Third, as stated previously, Congress added the “by 
regulation” language within the context of the agency’s regular 
use of case-by-case adjudication.  Because Congress was 
aware of the agency’s practice of adjudication, see Lorillard, 
434 U.S. at 580, its inclusion of the “by regulation” language 
added another means by which the agency could categorize 
crimes as particularly serious: rulemaking.  This interpretation 
of the “by regulation” clause accords with principles of 
administrative law.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
202 (1947) (observing that “there is . . . a very definite place 
for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards” because 
“problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency 
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F.3d at 1106 (holding that § 1158(b)(2)(B) “does not require 
the Attorney General to anticipate every adjudication by 
promulgating a regulation covering each particular crime”); 
Gao, 595 F.3d at 556 (rejecting the view that “regulation is the 
exclusive means by which the Attorney General can determine 
that a non-aggravated felony is a particularly serious crime” 
because, among other things, “requiring an agency to proceed 
                                                                
could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved 
despite the absence of a relevant general rule”).    
Finally, to the extent that Judge McKee asserts that 
Congress must confer adjudicatory powers upon the agency to 
determine which crimes are particularly serious, it has already 
done so.  An IJ “conduct[s] proceedings for deciding the 
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(a)(1).  The IJ, among other things, “receive[s] evidence, 
and interrogate[s], examine[s], and cross-examine[s] the alien 
and any witnesses.”  Id. § 1229a(b)(1).  Afterwards, the IJ 
“shall decide whether an alien is removable . . . based only on 
the evidence produced in the hearing.”  Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).  
Congress has therefore authorized IJs to decide whether an 
alien is removable.   
This decision, in turn, requires that an IJ consider 
whether there are grounds to order or not order an alien’s 
removal.  An IJ, for example, may consider a request for 
asylum, which includes evaluating whether there are legal 
impediments to receiving this relief, such as certain prior 
convictions.  Thus, the authority to decide whether an alien is 
removable or eligible for relief from removal through asylum 
includes the authority to decide whether the alien committed a 
“particularly serious crime” that precludes asylum relief.  See 
id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).  As a result, Congress has delegated the 
power to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis to the agency.   
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by rulemaking alone could stultify the administrative process 
by rendering it inflexible and incapable of dealing with many 
of the specialized problems which arise” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); Ali, 468 F.3d at 469 (noting that 
“[a]n interpretation that requires the Attorney General and his 
agents to sift through each state’s code and prospectively 
identify by regulation every single crime that would qualify as 
‘particularly serious’ would impose an onerous burden,” and 
that “[n]othing in the statute’s text suggests a requirement that 
the Attorney General must engage in such an anticipatory 
task”).5  
                                                                
5 The congressional enactments during this period also 
show that the regulatory authority did not displace the Attorney 
General’s authority to also consider whether an alien 
committed a particularly serious crime on a case-by-case basis.  
Congress amended the immigration laws in the 1990s to limit 
the availability of asylum and other relief, St. Cyr v. I.N.S., 229 
F.3d 406, 411 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000); Garcia v. I.N.S., 7 F.3d 1320, 
1322 (7th Cir. 1993), and to “expedite” the removal of criminal 
aliens, Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2001), 
overruled on other grounds by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
516 (2003); DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 
1999).  To this end, Congress expanded the Attorney General’s 
authority by adding the “particularly serious crime” bar to the 
asylum statute in the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.  Congress also gave the 
Attorney General the authority to designate categories of 
offenses as particularly serious crimes that would bar asylum 
relief.  Before this regulatory authority was granted, the 
Attorney General had evaluated whether an offense was a 
particularly serious crime on a case-by-case basis.  Delgado, 
648 F.3d at 1106; Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247.  Because 
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Congress added this regulatory authority in the context of other 
legislation that increased the grounds to remove aliens, it 
would be inconsistent with this goal to believe that Congress 
replaced a case-by-case adjudicatory process with a regulation-
only process, which would slow the identification of qualifying 
offenses and remove consideration of facts that reveal whether 
the specific alien is a danger to the community.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); Gao, 595 F.3d at 557 (“It would be a 
Herculean task to sift through each state’s code and 
prospectively identify by regulation every single crime that 
would qualify as particularly serious.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
In addition, the caselaw landscape before 1996 and 
Congress’s reaction to it also show that inclusion of the “by 
regulation” language was a reaffirmation of regulatory 
authority.  Since In re Frentescu, the Attorney General could 
proceed by adjudication.  In other words, the adjudication door 
was open.  By the time Congress added this language in 1996, 
however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had closed 
the other door by holding that the agency could not use 
rulemaking.  Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 
1994).  Aliens in other circuits also attacked agency rules 
designating crimes as particularly serious as ultra vires, 
arguing that crimes could be particularly serious only if 
deemed so by adjudication.  See, e.g., Ahmetovik v. INS, 62 
F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (alien “contend[ed] that the BIA 
should have conducted a broad inquiry into the facts 
underlying her conviction in order to determine whether the 
crime was ‘particularly serious.’”).  By adding “by regulation,” 
therefore, Congress ended this debate:  it rejected Komarenko 
and allowed the agency to proceed by rulemaking.  Contrary to 
Judge McKee’s contention that the phrase is meaningless, it 
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 For these reasons, we hold that under the asylum statute, 
(1) aggravated felonies are a subset of offenses that constitute 
particularly serious crimes; (2) the Attorney General has the 
authority to designate other offenses as per se particularly 
serious; and (3) the Attorney General retains the authority, 
through a case-by-case evaluation of the facts surrounding an 
individual alien’s specific offense, to deem that alien to have 
committed a particularly serious crime. 
 
B 
 
    We next examine the phrase “particularly serious 
crime” in the withholding of removal statute to determine 
whether it also includes, but is not limited to, aggravated 
felonies.  The “particularly serious crime” bar in that statute 
provides: 
 
Subparagraph (A) [providing for withholding of 
removal] does not apply to an alien deportable 
under section 1227(a)(4)(D) of this title or if the 
Attorney General decides that— 
. . .  
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious 
                                                                
clarifies that both the adjudication and rulemaking doors are 
open to the agency, leaving the agency discretion to choose 
between them.   
For these additional reasons, we conclude that the 
Attorney General has authority both to designate categories of 
offenses as particularly serious crimes and to decide whether 
an alien’s offense constitutes a particularly serious crime on a 
case-by-case basis.     
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crime is a danger to the community of the 
United States; 
  . . .  
For the purposes of clause (ii), an alien who has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony (or 
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced 
to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 
5 years shall be considered to have committed a 
particularly serious crime.  The previous 
sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General 
from determining that, notwithstanding the 
length of sentence imposed, an alien has been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).    
 
In Alaka, we interpreted the phrase “particularly serious 
crime” as used in the withholding statute to be limited to 
aggravated felonies.  456 F.3d at 104-05.  The Alaka court 
examined only the withholding statute, and no party presented 
the Alaka court with the identical phrase from the asylum 
statute.  Thus, the Alaka court was not required to consider 
whether the use of the phrase in the asylum statute should 
influence its interpretation of the identical phrase in the 
withholding statute.  Unlike our colleagues in Alaka, we must 
interpret the phrase as used in both statutes because Bastardo-
Vale seeks both asylum and withholding of removal relief.  We 
must therefore proceed in this case mindful that “[i]n all but 
the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase 
must have a fixed meaning.”  Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Hunt, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019) 
(citation omitted); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 
(2005) (“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two 
21 
statutes having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to presume 
that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in 
both statutes.”).  As a result, we will reexamine our earlier 
interpretation of the phrase “particularly serious crime” as it is 
used in the withholding of removal statute.   
 
As we already stated, the phrase “particularly serious 
crime” as used in the asylum statute includes but is not limited 
to aggravated felonies.  Examining the identical phrase in the 
withholding of removal statute, we reach the same conclusion.  
The withholding of removal statute specifically lists a subset 
of aggravated felonies deemed per se “particularly serious 
crimes.”  The statute provides that “an alien who has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the 
alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment 
of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a 
particularly serious crime.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).  
Through this language, Congress designated a category of 
aggravated felonies based upon the punishment imposed to be 
a particularly serious crime.  In the very next sentence, 
Congress expressly stated that its directive concerning aliens 
convicted of aggravated felonies and sentenced to five or more 
years’ imprisonment did not “preclude the Attorney General 
from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence 
imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime.”  Id.  The language embodies Congress’s explicit 
statement that the Attorney General had the continuing 
authority to determine whether a crime is particularly serious.  
This demonstrates that Congress did not disturb the Attorney 
General’s prior practice of deciding, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether an alien’s crime was particularly serious.  See N-A-M 
v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1056 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing 
that the “long history of case-by-case determination” of 
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particularly serious crimes “counsels against . . . a bright-line 
rule” for determining which crimes are particularly serious 
(citations omitted)).  Indeed, the language of § 1231(b)(3)(B) 
is permissive, not restrictive, in that it does not explicitly 
dictate that the only offenses that constitute particularly serious 
crimes are aggravated felonies.  See Delgado, 648 F.3d at 
1104; Gao, 595 F.3d at 555; N-A-M, 587 F.3d at 1056.   
 
Moreover, Congress used both “aggravated felony” and 
“particularly serious crimes” in the statute and, as stated 
earlier, we are obligated to give each word meaning.  See N-
A-M, 587 F.3d at 1056 (holding that “Congress’s use of two 
different terms—‘particularly serious’ crime and ‘aggravated’ 
felony—is additionally indicative of substantively different 
meanings”).  To say that only aggravated felonies are 
“particularly serious crimes” would render the words 
“particularly serious crime” surplusage.  Put differently, if 
Congress did not intend for crimes other than aggravated 
felonies to disqualify aliens from withholding of removal, then 
it would have simply said that (1) an alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony and sentenced to at least five years of 
imprisonment is barred from relief and that (2) the Attorney 
General may, in his discretion, bar those who are convicted of 
an aggravated felony and who received sentences of less than 
five years from relief.  Congress’s inclusion of the words 
“particularly serious crime” in addition to the words 
“aggravated felony” conveys that the bar may apply to those 
who are convicted of crimes other than aggravated felonies too 
when the Attorney General determines the offense is a 
particularly serious crime.    
 
In sum, the language of the withholding of removal 
statute shows that aggravated felonies are a subset of 
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particularly serious crimes and that Congress has deemed one 
subset of aggravated felonies, namely those for which the alien 
was sentenced to at least five years, particularly serious per se.  
Our sister circuits have also embraced the view that the phrase 
“particularly serious crime” as used in the withholding of 
removal statute includes but is not limited to aggravated 
felonies.  See Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1102-04; Gao, 595 F.3d at 
554-55; N-A-M, 587 F.3d at 1056; Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 156-
57; see also Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 289, 296 
(1st Cir. 2018) (adopting a case-by-case approach for 
determining “whether a non-aggravated felony qualifies as a 
particularly serious crime rendering an alien ineligible for 
withholding of deportation” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Thus, under the language of both the asylum and 
withholding statutes, the phrase “particularly serious crime” 
means the same thing: both aggravated felonies and other 
offenses can be particularly serious crimes.6    
 
In reaching this conclusion, we depart from our 
precedent in Alaka.  In our Court, precedent is binding on later 
panels, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1, and “[w]e do not overturn our 
precedents lightly,” Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc).  Indeed, this practice shows our Court’s respect for the 
                                                                
6 The differences in the statutes do not mean that the 
phrase “particularly serious crime” should be given a different 
meaning.  While asylum is discretionary and withholding of 
removal is mandatory, and entitlement to asylum is met by a 
lower standard of proof than that required for withholding of 
removal, each statute reflects Congress’s view that a 
“particularly serious crime” bars aliens from obtaining certain 
immigration relief.   
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role of stare decisis and the predictability it affords.  See Payne 
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (noting that stare 
decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process” (citation omitted)).  This case, 
however, presents a “rare occasion” where departure is 
required for four reasons.  See In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 
114, 117 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  First, in the twelve years 
since Alaka, no other appellate court tasked with interpreting 
the phrase “particularly serious crime” has concluded that it 
only includes aggravated felonies.  While we generally “decide 
cases before us based on our own examination of the issue, not 
on the views of other jurisdictions,” these more recent 
decisions suggest that we should “consider whether the 
reasoning applied by our colleagues elsewhere is persuasive.”  
Id. at 121; Joyce v. Maersk Line Ltd, 876 F.3d 502, 512 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[W]hen our Court is in disagreement 
with every other circuit to consider a question, it can be wise 
to reconsider our prior reasoning.”).  Second, the phrase 
“particularly serious crime” is used in both the asylum and 
withholding of removal statutes and should be interpreted to 
mean the same thing.  See, e.g., City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 
233.  Third, by interpreting the phrase consistently across 
similar statutes, and similar to our sister circuits, we ensure that 
aliens in different circuits with identical convictions are treated 
similarly.  Finally, as explained above, limiting the phrase 
“particularly serious crimes” to encompass only aggravated 
felonies “cannot easily be reconciled with the text” of the 
asylum and withholding of removal statutes.  See Al-Sharif, 
734 F.3d at 212.  Therefore, we now overrule Alaka’s 
definition of particularly serious crime as being limited to 
aggravated felonies and hold that the phrase “particularly 
25 
serious crime” includes—but is not limited to—aggravated 
felonies.    
       
III 
 
Having determined that the phrase “particularly serious 
crime” can include offenses other than aggravated felonies, we 
now address the Government’s argument that Bastardo-Vale 
waived his right to challenge the BIA’s application of N-A-M- 
to his conviction.   
 
“[A]n appellant’s opening brief must set forth and 
address each argument the appellant wishes to pursue in an 
appeal.”  Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).  If an argument on 
appeal is not “supported specifically by ‘the reasons for [it], 
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which 
the appellant relies,’” it is not properly preserved.  Id. (quoting 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)).  We typically decline to address 
arguments not properly preserved in the “original briefs” to us.  
See Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793, 795 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1987).    
 
Bastardo-Vale failed to argue in his opening brief to us 
that the BIA improperly applied N-A-M- in concluding that his 
conviction for second-degree unlawful imprisonment was a 
particularly serious crime.  Instead, Bastardo-Vale argued only 
that, because he was not convicted of an aggravated felony, the 
particularly serious crime bar did not apply to his claims for 
asylum and withholding of removal.  Bastardo-Vale’s clear 
focus on Alaka in his brief to our Court and his omission of 
any argument regarding the BIA’s application of N-A-M- and 
its analysis of the circumstances of his offense constitutes a 
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waiver of any challenges to the BIA’s assessment of whether 
his offense of conviction constitutes a particularly serious 
crime.  Thus, we will leave the BIA’s conclusion undisturbed.7 
 
IV 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.  
                                                                
7 Even if Bastardo-Vale did not waive this argument, 
there is likely enough evidence to uphold the BIA’s 
determination that he committed a particularly serious crime.  
McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
 Today we hold that the panel in Alaka v. Attorney 
General1 erred in concluding that “particularly serious crime,” 
as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), is not limited 
to aggravated felonies.  Although I concede that the question is 
a close call, I agree with Judge Ambro that the category is 
limited to aggravated felonies.  Accordingly, I join Judge 
Ambro’s dissent from the Majority’s analysis of that issue.  For 
the reasons he explains in his dissent, I agree that Congress 
intended to limit particularly serious crimes in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) to aggravated felonies.  However, like Judge 
Ambro, I also commend Judge Shwartz for her analytical 
approach in explaining the Majority’s conclusion that Alaka 
was wrongly decided.  I share the concern expressed in the 
Majority Opinion regarding the “IJ and BIA’s blatant disregard 
of the binding regional precedent” of this Article III Court.2  
The Majority’s approach of avoiding a discussion of In re M-
H-,3 and Chevron deference,4 is in the best tradition of Article 
III jurisprudence.  
   
Nevertheless, I cannot agree that the Majority has 
appropriately dealt with the unambiguous phrase “by 
regulation” in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B); therefore, I must also 
respectfully dissent from the Majority’s interpretation of that 
provision.  As I explain below, my colleagues’ analysis and 
discussion of that phrase simply reads it out of the statute.  
Although I appreciate the difficulties that can result from 
interpreting the statute as Congress wrote it, I am not 
convinced by the Majority Opinion that those difficulties 
justify simply ignoring the express limitation that Congress 
placed upon the Attorney General’s authority to define crimes 
as being “particularly serious.”   
                                                                
1 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006). 
2 Maj. Op. at 6 n.1. 
3 26 I. & N. Dec. 46 (BIA 2012). 
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). See also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (explaining 
when an Article III court owes deference to the administrative 
agency’s interpretation of a statute). 
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I.  
 
Congress unambiguously stated that “[t]he Attorney 
General may designate by regulation offenses that will be 
considered to be a [particularly serious] crime.”5  My 
colleagues argue that the fact that the statute says the Attorney 
General “may” designate offenses as particularly serious 
crimes by regulation does not mean the Attorney General may 
only do so by regulation.  They believe that Congress did not 
intend to preclude the Attorney General from also so 
designating offenses by agency adjudication.6  They proclaim: 
“the grant of regulatory authority to designate classes of 
offenses as particularly serious crimes did not displace the 
Attorney General’s authority to also make case-specific 
determinations concerning whether an alien’s offense should 
be deemed ‘particularly serious.’”7  However, that 
proclamation ignores that Congress did expressly limit that 
grant of regulatory authority.  It stated that the Attorney 
General could designate additional crimes “by regulation.” 
 
My colleagues suggest that Congress would have stated 
that “the Attorney General shall designate by regulation,” if 
Congress intended to require the Attorney General to act by 
regulation only.  However, inserting a command such as 
“shall” instead of “may” would almost certainly obligate the 
Attorney General to designate additional particularly serious 
crimes, whether or not the Attorney General would otherwise 
have done so.  Surely Congress did not intend to require the 
Attorney General to designate additional crimes as being 
“particularly serious” within the meaning of the statute.  
Rather, Congress left that decision to the discretion of the 
Attorney General.  Had Congress intended to allow the 
Attorney General to designate other crimes as particularly 
serious in any way that s/he chose, rather than relying on “may” 
in drafting § 1158(b)(2)(B), Congress would have said 
something like: “[t]he Attorney General may designate by 
regulation, or otherwise, offenses that will be considered to be 
a crime described in clause (ii) . . . of subparagraph (A).”  Or, 
Congress could have omitted the limiting phrase completely 
                                                                
5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
6 Maj. Op. at 13. 
7 Id. at 13–14. 
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and just said: “[t]he Attorney General may designate offenses 
that will be considered to be a crime described in clause (ii) . . 
. of subparagraph (A).”  It chose not to do that, so the limiting 
phrase that was inserted must mean something. 
 
My colleagues gloss over the fact that they are reading 
“by regulation” out of the statute by explaining “[t]his 
authorization . . . is permissive and does not preclude the 
Attorney General from evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the facts and circumstances of a conviction also 
support concluding that an individual alien committed a 
particularly serious crime.”8  But simply saying the authority 
that Congress granted is “permissive” surely cannot negate the 
express limitation Congress placed on that permission or the 
resulting limitation on how the Attorney General may exercise 
that authority.  The statute is permissive, but the permission is 
not absolute. 
 
A simple and practical hypothetical is illustrative here.  
Assume that a child living in Newark, New Jersey asks her 
mother for permission to travel to New York City for the 
weekend, and the mother responds, “you may go to New York 
for the weekend.”  Now, imagine the mother’s horror when the 
daughter calls from Los Angeles and tells the mother that she 
had permission to travel there because the mother simply said 
the daughter may go to New York, but did not say that the 
daughter may not go to Los Angeles or that she must go to New 
York.  The daughter’s claim of parental permission would be 
no less valid than the grant of congressional permission which 
my colleagues rely upon here.  Yet, I think it is safe to assume 
that the daughter’s explanation would be met with something 
less than enthusiastic approval.  It is an argument that no parent 
would accept, and this Court should not accept it either.  
 
The analogy is not as far afield as the very different 
context may suggest.  Such “permission by omission” (or more 
precisely, license by omission) is exactly what the Majority is 
authorizing. 
My colleagues explain that “[i]mmigration officials 
have proceeded via case-by-case adjudication since the early 
                                                                
8 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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1980s.”9  They argue that “[w]e presume that Congress was 
aware of this procedure in 1996 when it granted the Attorney 
General the authority to identify by regulation categories of 
crimes that may be deemed per se particularly serious 
crimes.”10  But therein lies the proverbial rub.  Congress did 
not have to include the limitation “by regulation” when the 
statute was amended in 1996.  It is much more logical to 
conclude that Congress included that limitation because it was 
concerned about what immigration officials had been doing 
“since the early 1980s,” and wanted to limit the Attorney 
General’s exercise of discretion.  Why else include the 
limitation – “by regulation?”  The fact that Congress was aware 
of what immigration officials had been doing for 16 years 
before adding “by regulation” to the statute is perhaps the 
strongest argument against the Majority’s position.    
 
The Majority Opinion attempts to rescue the jettisoning 
of this limiting phrase in part by citing to Rossman v. Fleet 
Bank (R.I.) National Association,11 and arguing that we there 
relied upon the “‘permissive sense’ of the word ‘may.’”12  
However, Rossman is totally irrelevant to our inquiry here.  
There, a borrower sued Fleet Bank arguing that a fee imposed 
that was not disclosed in the credit card solicitation violated the 
Truth in Lending Act.  The bank claimed that the credit 
solicitation only had to accurately disclose fees which were 
contemplated when it issued the solicitation agreement.  The 
Act required disclosure of “[a]ny annual fee . . . imposed for 
the issuance or availability of a credit card.”13  A controlling 
regulation required disclosure of “[a]ny . . . periodic fee . . . 
that may be imposed for the issuance . . . of a credit or charge 
card.”14  The borrower claimed that this meant that Fleet had 
to disclose any fee that may ever be imposed for the credit card.  
                                                                
9 Id. (citing Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 
2011) (en banc)).  
10 Id.  
11 280 F.3d 384, 393 (3d Cir. 2002).  
12 Maj. Op. at 14 n.4. 
13 Rossman, 280 F.3d at 392 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1637 
(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I)). 
14 Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(2)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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However, applicable provisions of the Truth in Lending Act 
allowed the bank to make subsequent changes to fees as long 
as they did not “affect the accuracy of a previous disclosure.”15  
We agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that “in this 
context” the “use of the word ‘may’ does not compel adoption 
of plaintiff’s interpretation.”16  Context matters; and the 
context in which “may” was used in the statute and regulation 
at issue in Rossman is wholly unhelpful to our inquiry into 
what that word means in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(B)(ii).  
 
My colleagues’ allusion to a second problem with my 
interpretation of the asylum statute is not helpful either.  They 
cite Lorillard v. Pons17 to argue that we presume Congress was 
aware that the Attorney General had been defining new crimes 
as serious crimes on a case-by-case basis and that Congress 
therefore accepted the practice by subsequently re-enacting the 
statute “without change.”18  However, as I explain in more 
detail below, Congress did not reenact the statute “without 
change,” it amended it by adding the limitation “by 
regulation,” thereby limiting the authority of the Attorney 
General.  
 
In order to justify reading “by regulation” out of the 
statute, the Majority Opinion also partially relies upon a 
discussion of some of the regulatory history and agency and 
judicial decisions that preceded the 1996 amendments.19  That 
analysis may have some relevance to an inquiry into the 
meaning of an ambiguous statute.  However, there is nothing 
ambiguous about the phrase “by regulation” or any other part 
of the statute that we are discussing, and my colleagues do not 
suggest that there is any ambiguity. Accordingly, much of the 
discussion in footnote five of the Majority Opinion should 
simply be irrelevant to our inquiry here.  It is the cardinal canon 
of statutory interpretation that a court must begin with the 
statutory language.  “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
                                                                
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 393 (emphasis added). 
17 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
18 Maj. Op. at 13. 
19 Id. at 13–17. 
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says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”20 
 
The Majority’s analysis is also contrary to our 
obligation to give effect to each word of a statute “so that no 
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”21  
Ironically, the Majority Opinion stresses that its reading 
“give[s] effect to every word of the statute.”22  But simply 
saying so does not make it so.  It completely ignores the 
limiting phrase: “by regulation.” 
 
I realize, of course, that the Supreme Court has long 
held that courts must presume Congress intended “a sensible 
construction” of statutes and that any interpretation that 
produces an absurd result suggests that Congress did not intend 
that which the text of a statute would otherwise require.23  
However, neither the Majority here, nor the decisions of our 
sister courts of appeals that are relied upon, make any serious 
attempt to show that limiting the Attorney General to the 
regulatory process would create such an absurdity and 
therefore counsel against a literal interpretation of “by 
regulation.”  Merely saying that such a limitation “would 
impose an onerous burden,”24 does not mean that it would 
create an absurdity.  Many restrictions on government action 
may be viewed by some as onerous or burdensome.  That is 
                                                                
20 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
21 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting 
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). 
22 Maj. Op. at 11 (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486–87 (1868). See 
also Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 
F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Sept. 17, 2018) 
(“Nevertheless, it is also a ‘basic tenet of statutory 
construction . . . that courts should interpret a law to avoid 
absurd or bizarre results.’”) (quoting In re Kaiser Aluminum 
Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
24 Maj. Op. at 17 (quoting Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469 
(7th Cir. 2006)). 
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particularly true of restrictions on governmental exercise of 
power.  Indeed, the entire regimen established under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and related treaties impose 
burdens on the Executive’s exercise of authority.  But 
burdensome limitations do not automatically rise to the level 
of an absurdity for purposes of statutory construction.   
 
Nevertheless, my colleagues do insist that limiting the 
Attorney General to the regulatory process “would impose an 
onerous burden.”25  However, the “burdens” imposed by 
requiring the Attorney General to engage in rulemaking to 
supplement the list of crimes that are particularly serious are 
not so onerous or impossible as to make the resulting scheme 
absurd.  To the extent that requiring the Attorney General to 
invoke the regulatory process before allowing the Attorney 
General to exclude an entire category of persons from 
eligibility for a favorable exercise of discretion imposes an 
undue burden, it is a burden that Congress, and not the courts, 
must mitigate.  
II. 
 
 My colleagues also rely on decisions of our sister 
appellate courts for their conclusion that “by regulation” 
includes case-by-case adjudication, but those decisions are 
devoid of the kind of analysis that should be required before 
ignoring an unambiguous statutory limitation on the authority 
of the Attorney General.  Most of the cases relied upon by the 
Majority contain precious little (if any) analysis of the limiting 
phrase “by regulation” in § 1158(b)(2)(B).  They merely recite 
the statutory text, don jurisprudential blinders, and blithely 
conclude that the statute doesn’t say what it says.  For example, 
in Ali v. Achim, relied on by the Majority, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit actually stated: “[n]owhere does [the 
statute] purport to prohibit the Attorney General from 
determining in a given case that an alien’s nonaggravated 
felony is ‘particularly serious’ unless he had the foresight to 
explicitly itemize that particular crime by regulation.  The 
statutory language simply is not susceptible to such a limited 
interpretation.”26  But of course, the statute is not only 
susceptible to that interpretation; it says exactly that in 
                                                                
25 Id. 
26 468 F.3d at 469. 
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unmistakable language.  By its very terms it does “purport to 
prohibit the Attorney General from determining in a given case 
that an alien’s nonaggravated felony is ‘particularly serious’ 
unless” the determination is done “by regulation.”  The court’s 
declaration to the contrary is nothing more than ipse dixit, and 
my colleagues’ citation to it is also an ipse dixit; it could not 
more clearly conflict with the statutory text.   
 
Similarly, in Delgado, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit relied on Ali’s analysis to conclude that, even 
though the statute “is silent on case-by-case adjudication,” it 
“does not require the Attorney General to anticipate every 
adjudication by promulgating a regulation covering each 
particular crime.”27  But the statute is not silent on case-by-case 
adjudication.  Moreover, the Delgado court was affording 
Chevron deference to the BIA.  
 
Two issues relevant to our discussion were before the 
court in Delgado.  First, whether the withholding statute 
limited particularly serious crimes to aggravated felonies; and 
second, whether, under the asylum statute, the Attorney 
General was limited to the regulatory process in order to 
declare other crimes particularly serious.  On the first question, 
because there was no controlling judicial precedent to guide its 
analysis, the court relied upon Chevron and deferred to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the statute.  The court’s analysis can be 
summed up in its statement: “[u]nder Chevron, we owe 
deference to the BIA’s interpretation.”28  
 
The court then decided that “by regulation” also 
included case-by-case adjudication, in part by deferring to the 
BIA.  It stated: “[b]ecause the history of the withholding and 
asylum statutes are similar, our conclusion as to the 
withholding statute is instructive.”29  The court then cited the 
BIA’s history of case-by-case adjudication and concluded that 
“the Attorney General has the authority to designate offenses 
as particularly serious crimes through case-by-case 
adjudication.”30  Since the court failed to provide any in-depth 
                                                                
27 648 F.3d at 1106. 
28 Id. at 1102. 
29 Id. at 1106. 
30 Id. (citing Ali, 468 F.3d at 469). 
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analysis of why it could ignore the clear limitation in the 
statute, it does not provide much guidance for our inquiry into 
the meaning of this unambiguous statute.    
  
The other case that the Majority relies upon for the 
proposition that “by regulation” includes case-by-case 
adjudication is Gao v. Holder.31 Gao suffers from similar 
flaws.  There, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited 
to the decision in Ali.  It, too, read the explicit limitation, “by 
regulation,” out of the statute, concluding that “nothing in the 
statute says that the Attorney General must use regulation to 
designate crimes as particularly serious.”32  Thus, as in Ali and 
Delgado, the court put on blinders and concluded that the 
statute does not say what it says.  And, as in Delgado, the court 
then proceeded to defer to the BIA’s decision to determine 
particularly serious crimes on a case-by-case basis.33  It 
concluded “the choice made between proceeding by general 
rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily 
in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”34  
However, that is clearly not true where, as here, Congress has 
imposed limits on the exercise of that informed discretion.  
These decisions simply do not provide sufficient support for us 
to ignore the text of this unambiguous statute. 
  
Moreover, as my colleagues note, and as I have noted 
above, Congress specifically amended the asylum statute to 
add the limiting phrase: “by regulation.”35  I have already 
mentioned this, but I think it is worth reiterating that the 
limitation was not included in the asylum statute before 1996.36  
The statute simply barred asylum where the alien committed 
any aggravated felony.  The Attorney General did not have any 
authority to deny asylum based on the commission of any other 
                                                                
31 595 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2010). 
32 Id. at 556. 
33 Id. at 556–57. 
34 Id. at 556 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 
(1947)). 
35 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 104–208, div. C., tit. VI, § 604(a), 110 Stat 3009. 
36 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). 
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category of crime.37  If we are to give each word in the statute 
meaning,38 we must conclude that Congress specifically added 
“by regulation” to give the Attorney General a power which he 
did not already possess.  “When Congress acts to amend a 
statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and 
substantial effect.”39  Congress clearly thought that the 
Attorney General needed authority to designate other offenses 
as particularly serious crimes “by regulation.”  If my 
colleagues are correct and adding “by regulation” does not 
limit the Attorney General to the regulatory process, then that 
phrase in the 1996 amendment is absolutely meaningless.  
However, that conclusion violates our obligation to give 
meaning to every word of a statute.  If a congressional grant of 
authority was necessary to allow the Attorney General to 
designate offenses as particularly serious “by regulation,” then 
the Attorney General should need a congressional grant of 
authority to designate offenses as particularly serious by BIA 
adjudication.  
III. 
 
Accordingly, for all the reasons I have set forth above, 
I must respectfully dissent.  
                                                                
37 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (1996). 
38 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12 (“[W]e must give effect to 
every word of a statute wherever possible.”). 
39 Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). 
 
 
Carlos Eduardo Bastardo-Vale v. Attorney General  
of the United States 
No. 17-2017 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 I join in full Judge McKee’s dissent relating to the 
interpretation of “by regulation” in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B), 
which deals with asylum.  Thus, I write only with respect to 
whether a “particularly seriously crime” in the withholding-of-
removal provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) covers more 
than an aggravated felony.  It reads in part as follows:  
[Withholding of removal] does not apply. . . if 
the Attorney General decides that— 
 
(ii) the alien, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime is a 
danger to the community of the 
United States; 
. . .  
For the purposes of clause (ii), an alien who has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony (or 
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced 
to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 
5 years shall be considered to have committed a 
particularly serious crime.  The previous 
sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General 
from determining that, notwithstanding the 
length of sentence imposed, an alien has been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime. 
 
2 
 
Judge Shwartz, writing for the majority, holds that a 
“particularly serious crime” is not limited to an aggravated 
felony.  This overrules the contrary reading of Alaka v. 
Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 2006), a 
decision I authored as a matter of statutory interpretation.  
Though I disagree with our new interpretation, I commend 
Judge Shwartz for construing the withholding-of-removal 
provision in that analytical framework instead of focusing on 
whether the BIA’s decision, rendered after Alaka, in In re: M -
H, 26 I & N Dec. 46 (BIA 2012), is entitled to Chevron 
deference, an issue neither briefed nor decided in Alaka.   
 I do, however, continue to believe that Alaka got this 
right, and that the majority misreads the language of the 
withholding-of-removal statute.  The first sentence of the 
clarifying paragraph makes all aggravated felonies carrying a 
sentence of more than five years particularly serious; the 
second, which expressly refers back to “[t]he previous 
sentence,” authorizes the Attorney General to declare certain 
other crimes as particularly serious “notwithstanding the length 
of sentence imposed.”  On its face this appears to mean that the 
Attorney General’s discretion qualifies only aggravated 
felonies that resulted in a prison sentence of less than five 
years, and it does not extend to other crimes.  See Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 154 (2012) (“A proviso conditions the principal 
matter that it qualifies—almost always the matter immediately 
preceding.”). 
Thus the provision creates a three-tiered system: (1) 
certain aggravated felonies automatically are particularly 
serious (those with actual, aggregated prison sentences of at 
least five years); (2) other aggravated felonies with lesser 
prison sentences can be considered particularly serious on a 
3 
 
case-by-case basis free of the need to do so by regulation; and 
(3) all other crimes are not particularly serious.1     
The majority holds to the contrary that the Attorney 
General’s power conferred by the second sentence is 
effectively unlimited, but this does not fit the language of the 
statute.  If that had been Congress’s intent, it would have 
worded the provision differently, either adding “for any crime” 
after “notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed” or 
simply stating that “the previous sentence shall not preclude 
the Attorney General from determining in any other case that 
an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”  
Yet Congress did not enact any such addition.  Neither should 
a court. 
I respectfully dissent.  
                                              
1 This is different from the asylum statute, which creates only 
two tiers: aggravated felonies, all of which are particularly 
serious, and all other crimes, which may “by regulation” be 
designated as particularly serious.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
